Death Squads and International Norms

I’ve been thinking quite a bit about death squads today — mostly because of an interesting article by Greg Grandin I read this morning, but also partly because of correspondence with friends from Davao, partly because it’s a change from working on papers, and partly because I am clearly a somewhat disturbed person.


In the article I’ve linked to above, Grandin does a good job of explaining the role that death squads, which he defines as “[c]landestine paramilitary units, nominally independent from established security agencies yet able to draw on the intelligence and logistical capabilities of those agencies,” play in state terror campaigns to suppress dissidence.

I think, though, that he misses a key point about death squads: the role that international norms play in creating them. I’ve only ever come across one book that seriously engages this question, Bruce Campbell and Arthur Brennar’s Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with Deniability. With apologies for academic-ese, the book’s central argument can be summed up as follows:
Bruce Campbell poses one central question regarding the global phenomenon of death squads and vigilantism: following a Weberian conception, statehood is defined by the monopolization of the legitimate use of coercive force within a given territory. Why then, have so many states compromised this monopoly on force, devolving coercive power to private, extra-state forces by offering formal or tacit support to death squads and vigilante groups?

Drawing on literature on state violence, Campbell attempts to situate this devolution of force within the bounds of rational, conventional state behavior, arguing that subcontracting violence may be a state’s best, or only, available means of dealing with an internal threat.

As Ted Robert Gurr suggests, state violence is a response to “the existence of a class, group, or party that the ruling elite sees as a threat to its continued rule.” However, most modern states are constrained by both international and domestic laws and organizations, rendering full-scale, overt state repression a political impossibility. Death squads and vigilante groups, then, fill this gap, allowing states to orchestrate the violent suppression of dissident groups while retaining plausible deniability nationally and globally.

(from a paper I wrote last Spring, which then challenges aspects of this theory, at least as it applies to the Philippines, by introducing the element of personalistic politics, but that’s more than I care to get into at the moment)
Essentially, death squads exist where external pressure makes overt state repression politically impracticable. In this sense, they represent one of the greatest failures of the “international community,” which has a history of making an enormous fuss about state sponsored violence, while quietly tolerating extra- or quasi- state violence.

A case in point would be the Philippines during the Marcos era. The early period of the Marcos dictatorship was marked by mass arrests of Marcos’ political opponents. These arrests were conducted overtly, generated paperwork, and were undeniably tied to the central state’s policies. Consequently, foreign governments who cooperated with Marcos were compelled to censure him for his excesses.

In response, Marcos made a tactical shift to quasi-state repression. Instead of having dissidents arrested by the police and put in prison, he had them kidnapped by death squads, and disappeared or salvaged [tortured to death and left for public display]. This was clearly not a move that improved the human rights situation in the country, but it allowed Marcos to deny responsibility for abuses, a contention those who wished to collaborate with him — including, let’s not forget, Jimmy “
the Carter Doctrine” Carter — were happy to accept.

The Arroyo administration is, of course, another example. At the same time Arroyo is (to say the very least) tolerating hundreds of murders by death squads, she is being celebrated, in some quarters, for official policies she claims seek to curtail such violence.
By pressuring states to distance themselves from abuse while failing to combat the underlying political and social conditions that create it, the “international community” creates the conditions in which death squads thrive.

So fine, condemn death squads. Of course they should be condemned. Just… don’t get too comfortable about it.

UN report on extrajudicial murder in the Philippines

The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions (now there’s a job title) has just released his report on the Philippines. I realize that some of you may have actual lives, but I’m pretty excited it’s out, and I know human rights activists in the Philippines are too. The report doesn’t say anything that hasn’t been said before, and I’m not too optimistic about it having much of an effect internationally or even in the Philippines, but it’s some strong words from a credible source, and it certainly can’t hurt.

Sorry for the communication gap. It’s not as easy to stay in touch in Mindanao as it is in Manila.I’m in Zamboanga now, after 5 days in Davao. Everything’s been going well so far. I had to wake up kind of distressingly early for my flight, but I’m still mostly functional, was able to pull off an interview with the chief of staff of the local congresswoman. It would have been the congresswoman herself, but she was called away for a meeting with the President. People and their priorities, no?Davao is also a pretty fascinating city. It’s basically under a kept under an elightened reign of terror by the Mayor and his death squads. So, it’s very safe, very clean, the mayor is open to dialogue or rallies on issues related to the environment or globalization, but one step over the line, and you’re likely to end up with a bullet in your head. Especially for drug use, theft, other common crimes — or criticism of the Mayor,Which most people, naturally are afraid to do. There has been almost no one willing to speak out against him — one radio host did, survived having his station bombed and his house ambushed, only to die when his long-time card playing buddy was paid to stab him. All rumors of course, because the local press isn’t suicidal enough to report on it. (Although the mayor is broadcast every Sunday reading his list of people he’s giving a last chance to turn themselves in for rehabilitation, or, basically, be get shot) But everybody knows whats going on, and several people I talked to had witnessed people getting shot or stabbed by the death squads. The going rate, apparently, is a bit less than $100 a head for an assassination, conducted mostly by Rebel returnees or common criminals cut a deal to escape summary execution themselves.
I can write this here, because I know that it’s basically just family and friends that read this, but to go into more detail in a more public forum would be a decision never to return to Davao. And I can’t document anything, and couldn’t without a long time to do slow, deep, careful investigative work.
On the lighter side, I stayed out of trouble, and thus managed to actually have a good time in Davao. It’s much less chaotic than Manila — fewer people over a larger area. Mindanao is one of the few islands in the Philippines that’s not highly overpopulated. And has some of the cleanest municipal tap water, which is a nice change. When you get thirsty downtown, instead of having to get bottled, you buy a plastic bag full of water for a peso, rip it open with your teeth, and try to drink it before it spills all over your shirt. I’ve learned all kinds of new things to do with plastic bags. Eat rice and soup for example. Or, rice and noodles, since you must eat rice with everything here, even if you have another starch.
I was in town for the 7th anniversary of Davao City Food not Bombs, so got to help out with a mass feeding and an art session for street kids. I have a lot of photos, but will probably have to wait until I get back to Manila to post them, as it would take hours with this connection.
Zamboanga City, so far, does not seem as fearsome as its reputation. Part of the problem, I think, is that Zamboanga City is actually quite a bit safer than the surrounding areas, so the media always report from here. Thus, any reports on incidents in Basilan, Maguindanao, Sulu, will be filed with a Zamboanga dateline — ironically, because it’s relatively calm rather than because it’s a hotspot of insurgency. In any case, I have hosts here from a local NGO, so nobody’s letting me wander off alone into any stupid situations. Now I’m just trying to figure out how to get the US military here to talk to me…